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resource estimations in 
contingency Planning for  
Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Anette Boklund1*, Sten Mortensen2, Maren H. Johansen3 and Tariq Halasa1
1 Veterinary Institute, Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2 The Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration, Head Office, Glostrup, Denmark, 3 Veterinary Control Office North, Herning, Denmark
Preparedness planning for a veterinary crisis is important to be fast and effective in 
the eradication of disease. For countries with a large export of animals and animal 
products, each extra day in an epidemic will cost millions of Euros due to the closure 
of export markets. This is important for the Danish husbandry industry, especially the 
swine industry, which had an export of €4.4 billion in 2012. The purposes of this project 
were to (1) develop an iterative tool with the aim of estimating the resources needed 
during an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in Denmark, (2) identify areas, 
which can delay the control of the disease. The tool developed should easily be updated, 
when knowledge is gained from other veterinary crises or during an outbreak of FMD. 
The stochastic simulation model DTU-DADS was used to simulate spread of FMD in 
Denmark. For each task occurring during an epidemic of FMD, the time and personnel 
needed per herd was estimated by a working group with expertise in contingency and 
crisis management. By combining this information, an iterative model was created to 
calculate the needed personnel on a daily basis during the epidemic. The needed per-
sonnel was predicted to peak within the first week with a requirement of approximately 
123 (65–175) veterinarians, 33 (23–64) technicians, and 36 (26–49) administrative staff 
on day 2, while the personnel needed in the Danish Emergency Management Agency 
(responsible for the hygiene barrier and initial cleaning and disinfection of the farm) was 
predicted to be 174 (58–464), mostly recruits. The time needed for surveillance visits 
was predicted to be the most influential factor in the calculations. Based on results from 
a stochastic simulation model, it was possible to create an iterative model to estimate 
the requirements for personnel during an FMD outbreak in Denmark. The model can 
easily be adjusted, when new information on resources appears from management of 
other crisis or from new model runs.
Keywords: stochastic modeling, veterinary crisis, epidemics, simulation models, preparedness
inTrODUcTiOn
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious disease, which is known to spread easily 
within and between herds and cause severe economic losses in each herd as well as in the 
country (1). The control and eradication of FMD within the EU is governed by EU legislation 
(Council Directive 2003/85/EC of 29 September 2003; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
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TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0085&from=EN). Following the 
directive, EU member states are obliged to use a stamping out 
policy, involving quarantine, movement restrictions, zoning, and 
slaughter and disposal of all affected herds, followed by cleaning 
and disinfection (CD) of the farm. Additional control measures 
can be used, for example, preemptive culling or vaccination, after 
approval of the plan by the European Commission regulatory 
committee Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal 
Health.
Preparedness planning for a veterinary crisis, such as an FMD 
outbreak, is important in order to be fast and effective in the 
eradication of the disease. For countries with a large export of 
animals and animal products, each extra day in an epidemic will 
cost millions of Euros due to the closure of export markets. This 
is of utmost importance for the Danish swine industry, which had 
a yearly export of €4.4 billion in 2012 (2).
Modeling results have previously been used to inform decision-
making related to disease control options (3–14). Models have 
traditionally been including limitations on resources for culling 
and vaccination, while only few models have included resources 
for other things such as surveillance visits [e.g., Ref. (15)]. With 
this work, we propose to also use the outputs of simulation 
modeling for planning and operational purposes in a Veterinary 
Administration of a country before and during a veterinary 
crisis.
Geering and Lubroth (16) describe how the first step in pre-
paring a resource plan is to make a resource inventory, “listing 
all the resources needed to respond to a moderate-sized FMD 
outbreak or other high-priority emergency disease. The plan 
includes personnel, equipment, and other physical resources.” 
Garner et  al. (17) estimated the needed resources during a 
hypothetical FMD-epidemic in Australia, focusing on the 90th 
percentile out of 100 iterations simulated to set-off from the area 
previously predicted to give the worst epidemics in terms of 
size and duration (18). For the Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration, it is important to know how many persons must 
be available within hours and days in order to efficiently handle 
and eradicate the disease. And to consider whether these people 
are already available in the organization and how extra person-
nel can be recruited. Furthermore, it is important to consider, 
whether this personnel has the required level of education or if 
extra training and education is needed. Similarly, the need for 
materials and services during a veterinary crisis must be 
identified and quantified. These materials and services include 
for example cars, sampling materials and testing capacity at 
the laboratory, equipment for culling of animals, protective 
clothing, disinfection agents, valuators, trucks and rendering 
capacity.
The purposes of this project were (1) to develop an iterative 
tool with the aim of estimating the resources needed during an 
outbreak of FMD in Denmark and (2) to identify areas, which 
can be bottle necks in the veterinary administration, and thereby 
delay the control of the disease and the time to regain disease 
free status and the access to export markets. The tool developed 
should easily be updated, when new knowledge is gain from other 
veterinary crises or during an outbreak of FMD.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
The simulation Model
The DTU-DADS model (version 0.16) was used to simulate 
spread of FMD in Denmark (19, 20).
Farm Data
From the official Danish central herd register, all Danish herds 
registered with cattle, swine, sheep, or goat in the period from 
October 1st 2006 to September 30th 2007 were extracted and 
used in the model. This period was used to avoid influence of 
the blue tongue outbreak in Denmark, which started in October 
2007. For each herd, a unique identification number, the herd 
type, the numbers of animals of different types, and the UTM 
geo-coordinates was extracted. In total, 23,550 cattle herds, 11,473 
swine herds, and 15,830 sheep or goat herds were included. Sheep 
and goat herds were grouped in one category, called sheep, as 
there are a limited number of goat herds in Denmark, and they 
are considered to be handled similar to sheep herds during an 
epidemic. Furthermore, herds were described as different types, 
cattle herds as milking or beef cattle, sheep herds as commercial 
or hobby herds, and swine herds as 19 different herd types, based 
on their SPF status and their production type (5). For each herd, 
the rate of daily movements were calculated as the total numbers 
of movements off the herd in the 1-year period mentioned above 
divided by 365, for batches of animals moved to other herds or to 
abattoirs, respectively. For swine herds, animals moved to other 
herds were divided into sows or weaners. Farms including several 
species were separated into several herds, with different herd IDs 
but with the same coordinates.
Modeling Spread of Disease
Spread of disease was modeled to occur through seven different 
spread mechanisms: (1) direct contact, i.e., animal movements, 
(2) indirect medium risk contacts, i.e., veterinarians, artificial 
inseminators, or milk controllers, (3) indirect low risk contacts, 
i.e., visitors, feed stuff/rendering trucks, (4) abattoir trucks, 
(5) milk tankers, (6) markets, and (7) local spread.
Based on movement data from the period October 2006 to 
September 2007, the rate of movement per day for the individual 
herd was used as λ in a Poisson distribution simulating spread 
of disease. Similarly, the rate of abattoir deliveries was calculated 
for the individual herd and used as λ in a Poisson distribution 
simulating the risk of spread on the abattoir route. Contrary, 
the pick-up of milk from dairy herds was simulated as a Poisson 
distribution with λ  =  0.6 for all dairy herds. Indirect medium 
and low risk contacts were simulated with different λ for differ-
ent herd types (5, 19). Markets were simulated for cattle only, as 
markets in Denmark are restricted to cattle and horses, with an 
average of 3.5 extra contacts generated from a market. And local 
spread was simulated as a probability of spread within 3 km from 
infected herds, simulating the unexplained spread within short 
distance as a consequence of for example limited airborne spread, 
rodents, birds, flies, and animal movements or person contacts 
not registered (19, 20).
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Modeling Detection of Disease
Detection of the first infected herd was simulated to occur between 
day 18 and 23 after the disease was introduced, with a mode of 
21 days. Thereafter, the disease could be detected either from the 
farmer or veterinarian (basic surveillance) or from surveillance 
by official veterinarians as result of tracing contacts from infected 
herds or as surveillance in the protection or surveillance zones. 
The probabilities of detection by each type of surveillance were 
assumed to be dependent on the herd type, as different species 
show more or less clinical signs (19).
Modeling Control of Disease
After detection of disease, a set of control measures must be 
applied based on the EU council directive 2003/85/EC. These 
include depopulation of all detected herds, CD of infected proper-
ties, tracing (back and forward) of contacts, and establishment of 
protection (3 km) and surveillance (10 km) zones around detected 
herds. In both zones, movements of animals are prohibited and 
all herds must be surveyed at least twice in the protection zone 
and once in the surveillance zone, before the zones can be lifted.
In the model, herds were assumed to be depopulated as soon 
as capacity was available. A daily capacity for depopulation of 
2,400 ruminants and 4,800 swine was estimated by the industry 
and the Veterinary and Food administration based on experi-
ences with other diseases (19). Animals moved from a detected 
herd within 14 days before detection were assumed to be traced, 
and the receiving herd to be culled. For other traced contacts, the 
herds receiving contact were assumed to be put under surveil-
lance. Traced contacts and herds in the protection zone would 
be visited as soon as possible, depending on available resources 
for surveillance. A daily capacity for surveillance was estimated 
to 450 herds by the Veterinary and Food administration, based 
on experiences with other diseases (19). Herds in the protection 
and the surveillance zone would be set for surveillance visit 
immediately after the initiation of the zones, and herds in the 
protection zone would be set for another visit after 21 days and 
before lifting the zone. Details on how surveillance is modeled 
can be obtained from Halasa and Boklund (15). All sheep within 
the zones were simulated to be tested as described in the Danish 
contingency plan due to non-specific clinical signs in sheep (21). 
The probability of detecting disease from clinical surveillance and 
testing increased with time (5).
Furthermore, a 3-day national standstill for all animal move ments 
was modeled, based on the Danish contingency plan for FMD.
Initiation of Disease Spread and Model Run
One thousand cattle herds were randomly chosen and used to 
initiate the spread of disease (index herds). Epidemics starting 
in cattle herds have previously been shown to create some of the 
largest outbreaks under the simulated circumstances (5, 19).
For each index herd, one iteration was run, resulting in 1,000 
epidemic simulations. The outcome of the model included, for 
every iteration and for every day in the epidemic, which herds 
were detected, which herds were depopulated, and which herds 
were surveyed. Of the 1,000 simulated epidemics, in 19 cases, the 
disease did not spread from the first infected herd and was not 
detected, resulting in 981 simulated epidemics in total.
estimations of resources during an 
Outbreak
A working-group of 12 persons1 was constituted with staff from the 
Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (10 persons), with 
experience in contingency planning and handling of veterinary 
crises, and experts from the Danish Emergency Management 
Agency (DEMA) (1 person) and the National Veterinary Institute 
(1 person). A series of meetings were undertaken, in order for 
these experts to identify best practices for all work tasks during 
an epidemic and estimate the man power and other resources 
needed. In some cases, information was from external sources, 
while other information was exclusively based on the knowledge 
and experience within the group.
Estimates for resources during an outbreak were divided in 
resources for detected herds, suspected herds, surveyed herds, 
and local crisis centers (Tables 1 and 2). No assumptions were 
made regarding the skills required for neither different tasks nor 
the manpower available, except for the resource assumptions in 
the model, described in Section “Modeling Control of Disease.” 
Neither did we decide on whether veterinarians (VET) should 
be official veterinarians, vets from private practice or from other 
sources. “Technicians” (TECH) are defined as non-vets working 
as animal technicians or as legal advisors, HR, or IT personnel. 
Administrative personnel (ADM) were only related to work in 
the local crisis center (LCC). The DEMA is hired to be involved 
in the culling and cleaning phase on detected herds. They will 
be taking care of setting up an organizational board at the farm, 
cleaning and disinfecting people and trucks entering and leaving 
the farm, preliminary CD of the farm, and eventually transporta-
tion of culled animals. Personnel from DEMA were categorized as 
leading officers, officers, and recruits. For all groups of personnel, 
a detailed description of tasks and necessary skills was provided 
in the Danish report from the project (22).
Based on the daily outputs from the simulation model, per-
sonnel for valuation of herds for each day (i) in the epidemic 
was calculated as the total type of personnel (p) needed, i.e., the 
numbers of VETs, TECHs, ADMs, and staff from DEMA, for a 
given task (t), here valuation, and a given species (a) as:
 
Total animals orherds teamp,a,i,t g,a,i p,t,a
t,a
=∑ ( ) ⋅⋅ 1K  
(1)
where a is reflecting the animal species, g is the action these 
animals are undergoing—i.e., detection, depopulation, or surveil-
lance, teamp,t,a is the estimated team for a given type of personnel, 
task, and species, and Kt,a is the number of animals (or herds) of 
a given species that a team can handle per day for the given task.
For valuation, the number of veterinarians needed would then 
be calculated based on Eq. 1 as:
 
Total = herds VET 1VET,a,i,valuation detection,a,i valuation,∑ ⋅ ⋅ K valuation,a  
(2)
where VETvaluation is the number of VETs in the valuation team 
and Kvaluation is the number of herds a valuation team can handle 
in one day (Table 1).
1 Of the 12 persons, 3 are included as authors, and the 9 other persons are listed in 
the acknowledgements.
Table 1 | inputs used for estimation of the total personnel resources needed during a foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Denmark  
(brackets refer to eq. 1).
Task (t) Description Output from 
simulation model (g)
Team (team) estimate (k)
Detected herds
Valuation Valuation of animals in detected herds  
for compensations to the farmer
#Detected herds 3 assessor and 1 vet A team can per day assess
1 cattle herd or
2 swine herds or
4 sheep herds
1 car per team is needed
Culling Culling of all animals in detected herds #Animals in 
depopulated herds
1 coordinating vet Per hour
Cattle—1 vet, 4 
technicians, 1 truck driver
12 cattle
Swine—1 vet, 8–10 
technicians, 2 truck 
drivers
30 sows or 60 finishers  
or 300 weaners
Sheep—1 vet,  
1 technician
20 sheep
Cleaning and disinfection 
point
#Depopulated herds 1 vet in 4 h
Clinical examination and 
sampling
60 animals in detected herds are assumed  
to be sampled
#Depopulated herds 1 vet, 1 technician Per day: 1 herd
All animals are clinically evaluated
Cleaning and disinfection Preliminary CD #Depopulated herds 1 vet Per day: 1 cattle or swine herd
4 sheep herds
Personnel from the Danish Emergency  
Management Agency (DEMA)
#Depopulated herds 2 leading officers 2 days in each cattle/swine herd
Personnel from the DEMA #Depopulated herds 9 officers 2 days in each cattle/swine herd
Personnel from the DEMA #Depopulated herds 47 recruits 2 days in each cattle/swine herd
Final cleaning and 
disinfection
Conducted by subcontractors, but managed  
by this team
#Depopulated herds 1 vet 5 days in cattle and swine herdsa
0.5 day in sheep herdsa
suspicions We have assumed to have five suspected farms for each detected herd
Clinical suspected farms Fence, clinical inspections, testing, 
epidemiological interview, tracing
5 × #detected herds 1 vet, 1 technician Per day: 1 herd
surveillance in zones and 
in traced contact herds
The day of the surveillance is extracted from the simulation model
1 vet
Clinical surveillance #Surveyed herds Per day: 4 cattle or swine herds
Collection of blood samples #Surveyed herds 4 sheep herds
Vet, veterinarian.
aDivided over 21 days.
4
Boklund et al. Resource Estimations in Contingency Planning for FMD
Frontiers in Veterinary Science | www.frontiersin.org May 2017 | Volume 4 | Article 64
The total number of veterinarians needed for depopulation 
was calculated as:
 
Total = herds coordinatingVet  
+ ani
VET,a,i,depop depop,at,i∑
∑
⋅
mals VET
1
workingHours
depop,at,i depop
depop,at
⋅ ⋅
⋅K  (3)
where at is now reflecting the animal species and type of animal—
i.e., cattle, sheep/goat, sows, finishers, or weaners, VETdepop is 
the number of VETs in the depopulation team, and Kdepop is the 
number of animals a depopulation team can handle per working 
hour. The numbers of coordinating vets at the herd is a constant, 
with 1 as the default value. Working hours was estimated from the 
working group to be 8 h efficient work a day, excluding transport 
time, and breaks.
The number of veterinarians needed for the cleaning and 
disinfection point (CDP) of the herd was calculated as:
 Total = herds CDP VETVET,a,i,CDP depop,a,i CDP∑ ⋅ ⋅  (4)
where CDP is the numbers of CD points in a herd (default = 1), 
and VETCDP is the number of days that a veterinarian will be 
needed at the CDP (default = 0.5). The CDPs were assumed to 
be used in cattle and swine herds only, based on the limited herd 
sizes of Danish sheep and goat herds.
The numbers of veterinarians used for clinical inspection (CI) 
in detected cattle and swine was calculated as:
 
Total herds VET 1VET,a,i,CI depop,a,i CI
CI,a
=∑ ⋅ ⋅
K  
(5)
where VETCI is the numbers of veterinarians in the team used for 
CI in the herd and KCI is the number of herds a CI team can handle 
Table 2 | inputs used for estimation of the total personnel resources in local crisis centers (lccs) during a foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 
Denmark.
input Description Team estimate
LCCsa We assume that there will be three crisis centers active at all times during the epidemic. Management, 
communication, and competency development is in total, not per crisis center
Management (lead) 2 vet, 1 lawyer, 1 adm, 1 technician pr. crisis 
center, 1 human resource
Log and journals (log) Min. 3, 1 adm Per 5 detected herds
Press and communication (press) 1 technician Per crisis center
Case-officers (case) 1 adm Per 3 detected herds
Suspicion group (suspicion) 1 vet, ½ adm Per 2 SI the first 2 weeks, per 3 SI thereafter
Assessor (valuation) 1 adm Per 2 detected herds
Culling (cull) 1 vet Per 2 detected herds
Cleaning and disinfection Counted as part of detected herds
Epidemiology 1 vet, ½ adm Per 3 detected herds in the first 2 weeks, 
Per 4 detected herds thereafter
Screening (screening) 1 adm Per 50 detected herds
Movements and dispensations (MoveDisp) 1 vet, 1 adm First week  
Thereafter8 vets, 24 adm
Service and catering (service) 2 adm Per 100 persons
Logistics, equipment (log) 2 technicians, 5 adm Per 100 persons
Personnel administration (HR) 1 human resource person All epidemic
Competency development (Edu) 1 vet, 1 adm Per crisis center
Vet, veterinarian; Adm, administrative personnel.
aNames in brackets refer to the abbreviations used in the R-script (Supplementary Material).
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in one day. Because of the limited size of Danish sheep herds, CI 
and blood sampling was assumed to be included in the culling of 
the animals in sheep herds.
The numbers of veterinarians used for preliminary CD of 
detected herds was calculated as:
 
Total = herds VET 1VET,a,i,CD depop,a,i CD,a
CD,a
∑ ⋅ ⋅
K  
(6)
where VETCD is the numbers of veterinarians in the team used for 
initial CD of the herd and KCD is the number of herds a CD team 
can handle in 1 day.
The following final cleaning and disinfection (FCD) of herds 
was assumed to be done by private commercial cleaning compa-
nies, but under guidance and acceptance by the official veterinar-
ians. Therefore, for each species, a certain time was needed for 
the veterinarians, but spread over a 3 week period of time, as few 
hours are needed a day. This was calculated as:
 
Total
herds VET 1
durationVET,a,i,FCD
depop,a,i FCD,a
FCD,a
F
=
∑ ⋅ ⋅
K
CD  
(7)
where durationFCD is the time period over which the FCD is taking 
place and KFCD is the number of herds a FCD team can handle in 
1 day. This value is then included every day over the durationFCD.
When an epidemic is running, there will be suspicion of 
disease, also in herds that are not infected. Suspicions (SI), which 
are following detected with FMD as result of investigation, will in 
the model be counted as detected herds. However, there will be 
suspicion of FMD in non-infected herds as well.
As the simulation model only simulate spread of infec-
tion, we do not have information on non-infected SI from the 
model. Therefore, a conservative estimate based on data from 
the UK 2001 epidemic was used, i.e., five SI per detected herd 
was assumed for the numbers of inspections based on passive 
surveillance (23).
The SI were randomly distributed over a period of 10 days, 
starting the day after a herd was detected in the model. As it is not 
known in which herd type a suspicion will occur, we could not 
take herd type into account for SI. The number of veterinarians 
needed to inspect SI of FMD was calculated as:
 
Total herds VETVET,i,SI suspicion,i SI
SI,a
=∑ ⋅ ⋅
1
K  
(8)
where VETSI is the number of veterinarians used in the team 
investigating a suspicion and KSI is the number of herds a suspi-
cion inspection team can handle in 1 day.
The numbers of veterinarians needed for surveillance in 
traced herds and in herds in the protection or surveillance zones 
(zoneSurv) were calculated as:
 Total herds VETVET,i,zoneSurv surveillance,a,i zoneSurv= ∑ ⋅  (9)
where VETzoneSurv was the numbers of veterinarian needed for a 
surveillance visits. No difference was assumed between herd types 
for surveillance visits. From the output of the simulation model, 
the day of the surveillance visit was extracted and, therefore, even-
tual waiting time for a surveillance visit was already accounted for.
During an epidemic, a LCC will be created according to the 
Danish veterinary contingency plan (24). The numbers of LCCs 
in Denmark could vary from 1 to 3, related to the regions for offi-
cial veterinarians. It was assumed that all LCCs were active from 
the beginning to the end of the epidemic. The needed numbers 
of veterinarians were calculated as a total for all LCCs (Table 2). 
After the first 14 days after first detection, it was assumed that the 
experience in the crisis centers would result in more effectiveness 
FigUre 2 | The number of veterinarians needed during a foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in Denmark. Based on results from a 
stochastic simulation model simulating 981 FMD epidemics in Denmark, all 
starting in a cattle herd. The central administration is not included. The solid 
black line indicates the median value, the dotted black line indicates the 75th 
percentile, and the lower and upper dotted gray lines indicate the 5th and 
95th percentiles, respectively.
FigUre 1 | numbers of detected herds for each epidemic in a 
simulated Danish foot-and mouth disease-outbreak. Nine hundred 
eighty-one iterations were simulated, all starting in a randomly selected cattle 
herd. The solid black line indicates the median value, the dotted black line 
indicates the 75th percentile, and the lower and upper dotted gray lines 
indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively.
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in the centers and, therefore, the time needed for different work 
tasks would be reduced (Table 2). The numbers of veterinarians 
needed in the LCCs were calculated as:
Total LCC LCC herds susVET,i,LCC VET,management detect,a,i= ⋅ + ∑ ⋅( picion
LCC herds LCC
herd
VET,suspicion detect,a,i VET,EPI
⋅
+ ∑ ⋅
+ ∑ s LCC LCC
LCC
depopulated,a,i VET,depop VET,move
VET,comp
⋅ +
+  
(10)
where LCC is the numbers of local crisis centers, LCCVET,management 
are veterinarians working in the management of the group, 
LCCVET,suspecison are veterinarians working suspicisons, LCCVET,EPI 
are veterinarians working with epidemiology of the epidemic, 
LCCVET,depop are veterinarians working with depopulation of 
detected herds, LCCVET,move are veterinarians working with move-
ment restrictions in the zones, and LCCVET,comp are veterinarians 
working with educating new staff during the epidemic.
Similarly, the needed numbers of technicians, administrative 
staff, and personnel from DEMA were calculated for each day and 
each task in the epidemic, and summed over all tasks resulting in 
the daily needs for personnel. Furthermore, the needs for render-
ing capacity was calculated for ruminants and non-ruminants, 
and the needed equipment for culling and testing was calculated, 
however, not included in this paper. Details from these calcula-
tions can be obtained from the authors.
Materials
The simulation model as well as the calculations of resources 
was run using the freeware R (25). All estimated resources are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2 and calculations are presented above. 
The full model is available in the Datasheet S1 in Supplementary 
Material. From the stochastic simulation model, the following out-
puts per day of the epidemics were used as inputs in the resource 
calculations: numbers of detected herds, numbers of depopulated 
herds, numbers of animals (for each type of animal) in depopu-
lated herds, and numbers of surveyed herds (Table 1) resulting 
in a stochastic model of resources needed during an outbreak. 
Resource estimations were calculated for every single epidemic 
(981) and presented as median values and 5th–95th percentiles.
sensitivity analyses
The influence of estimates on the required number of staff dur-
ing an outbreak was investigated by decreasing or increasing the 
number of vets, technicians, and administrative staff as described 
in Table 4. We investigated the effect of change on valuation, cull-
ing, CD, surveillance visits in herds under suspicion of disease 
and in herds located in protection and surveillance zones, on staff 
at the LCCs being more or less efficient, the influence of only 
1 LCC, of DEMA present only 1 day in each herd compared to 
2 days (default), and of the numbers of DEMA personnel needed. 
Sensitivity analyses were run in 100 iterations.
resUlTs
The simulated epidemics had a median size of 22 (5–95%: 2–155) 
infected and detected herds (Figure 1) and a median duration 
of 34  days (5–95%: 2–142), counted from first detection until 
the last herd is culled, but not taking into account the time until 
zones are lifted. The median number of SI was 110 (5–95%: 
10–7,775).
Based on the results from the simulation models, we estimated 
that the need for personnel in the regions would peak in the first 
couple of days with a median of 116 veterinarians, 22 technicians 
needed, while the need for administrative personnel would peak a 
little later with a need for a median of 45 administrative personnel 
21 days in the epidemic (Figures 2–4; Table 3). Furthermore, the 
numbers of needed veterinarians would also increase at day 21, 
caused by the second surveillance visit of herds in the protection 
zone (Figure 2). Additionally, 174 persons would be needed from 
DEMA at day 2, mostly recruits (Figure 5; Table 3).
From the sensitivity analyses (Table 4), it was clear that the 
time needed to perform clinical surveillance in farms (either 
suspected farms or farms located in protection and surveillance 
zones) influences the estimated numbers of veterinarians and 
technicians needed during an outbreak. Increased efficiency 
FigUre 4 | The number of administrative personnel needed during an 
foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in Denmark. Based on results 
from a stochastic simulation model simulating 981 FMD epidemics in 
Denmark, all starting in a cattle herd. The central administration is not 
included. The solid black line indicates the median value, the dotted black 
line indicates the 75th percentile, and the lower and upper dotted gray lines 
indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively.
FigUre 3 | The number of technicians needed during an foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in Denmark. Based on results from a 
stochastic simulation model simulating 981 FMD epidemics in Denmark, all 
starting in a cattle herd. The central administration is not included. The solid 
black line indicates the median value, the dotted black line indicates the 75th 
percentile, and the lower and upper dotted gray lines indicate the 5th and 
95th percentiles, respectively.
Table 3 | estimated personnel needed at day 2, 7, 14, and 21 in 981 
simulated foot-and-mouth disease-epidemics in Denmark, starting  
in cattle herds given as median and 5th–95th percentiles.
Day in epidemic
2 7 14 21
Veterinarians 116 (60–164) 23 (12–144) 28 (12–94) 36 (19–135)
Technicians 22 (13–52) 16(11–33) 16 (11–35) 16 (12–38)
Administrative 35 (25–46) 19 (16–39) 19 (16–31) 45 (42–61)
Danish emergency 
management agency
174 (58–464) 58 (0–290) 58 (0–290) 58 (0–290)
FigUre 5 | The number of persons from the Danish emergency 
Management agency needed during an foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD) epidemic in Denmark. Based on results from a stochastic 
simulation model simulating 981 FMD epidemics in Denmark, all starting in a 
cattle herd. The solid black line indicates the median value, the dotted black 
line indicates the 75th percentile, and the lower and upper dotted gray lines 
indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively.
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of only one LCC decreased the total manpower needed during 
the epidemics.
DiscUssiOn
Based on results from a stochastic simulation model, it was 
possible to create a model in R to estimate the requirements for 
personnel during an FMD outbreak in Denmark. The model can 
easily be adjusted, when new information on resources appear 
from management of other crisis, or when new simulation results 
are available from new model runs in peacetime. Furthermore, it 
is possible to adjust the model during a crisis, when model results 
from daily runs of the stochastic simulation model gives more 
precise estimates on the specific epidemic, or when adjustments 
in management procedures becomes available.
It was not surprising to find that especially the number of 
staff needed for surveillance visit influenced our results, as the 
numbers of herds in zones are so large. This was also in line with 
what was found by Garner et al. (17). This means that if veterinar-
ians doing surveillance visits can be more efficient, the number 
of needed veterinarians will decrease substantially. On the other 
hand, if veterinarians are not careful, the probability of detection 
by surveillance visits will decrease, resulting in larger and longer 
lasting epidemics.
A peak for veterinarians was predicted very early in the epi-
demic (Figure 2). However, the assumption in the model is to be 
able to survey 450 farms a day in the protection and surveillance 
zones. If resources for this surveillance are reduced, as described 
by Halasa et al. (15), surveillance visits will be delayed, leading 
to delayed detections, prolonged epidemic duration, and an 
expected right shift in the peak for resources needed.
The resources estimated here were based on simulated epidem-
ics and were shown to follow the simulated epidemic peaks closely 
(Figures 1, 2 and 5), however, with some delays for technicians and 
administrative personnel (Figures 3 and 4) and with an increase 
in needed resources again around day. Varying model inputs in 
the simulation model have previously been shown to change the 
in the LCCs, leading to decreased time needed for each task, 
decreased the need for veterinarians, technicians and admin-
istrative personnel, and using DEMA personnel for only 1 day 
instead of 2 in detected herds, had large influence on the total 
numbers of DEMA staff needed. Furthermore, the involvement 
Table 4 | estimates of total manpower needs during a simulated Danish foot-and mouth disease-epidemic, measured as “Mann-days,” e.g., one person needed for 1 day (5th–95th percentiles).
changed parameter change (default) Veterinarians Technicians administrative staff Danish emergency management  
agency (DeMa)
Basica – 2,482 (641–9,223) 1,155 (423–3,366) 2,711 (951–7,985) 2,552 (226–20,346)
Valuation more efficient A team can per day assess: 2 (1) cattle herd  
or 4 (2) swine herds or 8 (4) sheep herds
2,474 (640–9,196) 1,142 (422–3,220) 2,709 (950–7,962) 2,552 (226–20,346)
Valuation less efficient 2 (1) teams needed for each valuation 2,498 (643–9,276) 1,188 (427–3,873) 2,717 (951–8,031) 2,552 (226–20,346)
Culling working hours decreased 6 (8) 2,485 (641–9,231) 1,161 (423–3,395) 2,712 (951–7,996) 2,552 (226–20,346)
Culling working hours increased 12 (8) 2,479 (641–9,215) 1,151 (423–3,343) 2,711 (951–7,974) 2,552 (226–20,346)
Clean less efficient Preliminary: 2 (1) vets for 1 day in cattle/ 
swine farms
2,500 (643–9,283) 1,155 (423–3,368) 2,713 (951–7,999) 2,552 (226–20,346)
1 vet 0.5 (0.25) day in sheep farms
Final: 7.5 (5) days in cattle and swine herdsb
1 (0.5) day in sheep herdsb
Clean more efficient Preliminary: 1 vets for ½ (1) day in cattle/ 
swine farms
2,473 (640–9,193) 1,155 (423–3,366) 2,711 (950–7,978) 2,552 (226–20,346)
1 vet 0.125 (0.25) day in sheep farms
Final: 3 (5) days in cattle and swine herdsb
0.25 (0.5) day in sheep herdsb
SuspicionVisits less efficient 2 (1) teams per day per herd 2,665 (714–9,252) 1,406 (501–4,153) 2,732 (953–7,987) 2,552 (226–20,346)
SuspicionVisits more efficient 1 team ½ (1) day per herd 2,448 (632–9,208) 1,008 (379–3,324) 2,702 (949–7,984) 2,552 (226–20,346)
SurveillanceVisits less efficient Per day: 2 (4) herds 3,399 (784–12,796) 1,167 (426–3,443) 2,768 (961–8,234) 2,552 (226–20,346)
SurveillanceVisits more efficient Per day: 8 (4) herds 2,121 (583–7,762) 1,149 (422–3,339) 2,688 (945–7,860) 2,552 (226–20,346)
LocalCrisisCenter, fewer 1 LCC (3) 2,072 (465–8,027) 731 (231–2,365) 2,197 (720–6,668) 2,552 (226–20,346)
LocalCrisisCenter less efficient All personnel in LCC half as efficient 3,732 (1,071–13,100) 1,902 (749–5,438) 5,096 (1,788–14,835) 2,552 (226–20,346)
LocalCrisisCenter more efficient All personnel in LCC twice as efficient 1,953 (427–7,629) 775 (256–2,480) 1,525 (532–4,560) 2,552 (226–20,346)
DEMA presence decreased Days per herd: 1 (2) 2,482 (641–9,223) 1,155 (423–3,366) 2,711 (951–7,985) 1,276 (113–10,173)
Fewer DEMA staff needed Lead Officers: 1 (2) 2,482 (641–9,223) 1,155 (423–3,366) 2,711 (951–7,985) 1,892 (168–15,084)
Officers: 6 (9)
Recruits: 36 (47)
More DEMA staff needed Lead Officers: 3 (2) 2,482 (641–9,223) 1,155 (423–3,366) 2,711 (951–7,985) 3,256 (289–25,959)
Officers: 12 (9)
Recruits: 59 (47)
Effect of varying parameter estimates (medians) on different resources in the resource calculations (5th–95th percentiles).
aSensitivity analyses are run in 100 iterations, so for comparisons, the same 100 iterations (1–100) were extracted.
bDivided over 21 days.
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outputs (5, 19) and corresponding changes in resources can be 
expected. Especially, the low risk contacts and the probability of 
local spread and disease detection were highly influential (19). 
Furthermore, a decrease in the length of the high-risk period 
(HRP) would decrease the size, duration, and costs of an outbreak 
(5). However, using a conservative estimate with a mode of 21 days 
(18–23) as the HRP would relate to the 2001 FMD epidemic in 
Europe, where the HRP was estimated to 21  days in the UK 
(26, 27) as well as in the Netherlands (28).
Our estimates were based on daily outputs from 981 simulated 
epidemics under a basic control strategy, e.g., the strategy expected 
to be used, if an outbreak would occur tomorrow. However, in 
very large epidemics, there is a probability that decision makers 
would not choose to stick to the basic control strategy, but would 
most likely add extra control measures such as preemptive culling 
or emergency vaccination, and therefore, the resources needed in 
the extreme epidemics would change.
Surprisingly, it was shown that there was a very high need for 
recruits from the DEMA used in the CD of detected herds (Figure 5), 
which might turn out to be a bottle neck; while our expectations 
were that the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration could 
run out of veterinarians.
Before the UK 2001 outbreak of FMD, the UK State Veterinary 
Service used two scenarios in their contingency planning, one 
moderate scenario with 10 simultaneous outbreaks and 1 severe 
outbreak, also with 10 simultaneous outbreaks, but with a large 
herd density. And they found a need for 235 veterinary officers, 
which they extrapolated to around 300 in more severe outbreaks. 
During the UK 2001 outbreak, 57 premises were infected before 
the first herd was diagnosed, leading to an almost immediate need 
for all state veterinary officers. Before the end of the outbreak, 
another 2,500 temporary veterinary inspectors were appointed, 
nearly 70 from abroad, and another 700 foreign government vets 
and secondees assisted in periods (29).
Based on the experience in the UK, we could fear that we are 
underestimating the needs during an FMD crisis in Denmark. 
However, even though we were interested in estimating man-
power and materials needed, we were also aware that we can end 
up with even larger epidemics. Therefore, it was important for us 
to create a model, which can easily be adjusted during a crisis in 
an iterative process. Each time new information become avail-
able, regarding the epidemic or the resources needed, it can be fed 
into the model, and new outputs can be calculated. For example, 
if the compositions of the veterinary teams for different tasks are 
changed, we will change the inputs in the model and rerun it. Or 
if we rerun the stochastic model with historic data from the first 
10 days of the epidemic, we will have more precise estimates on 
the further development of the epidemic and that can be put into 
the resource model.
The results of our estimations seem somewhat lower than what 
was estimated in Australia (17). Direct comparisons are difficult, 
due to geographical differences, resulting in several state disease 
control centers and local disease control centers in Australia, 
differences in estimated size of the epidemic, i.e., Garner et  al. 
chose a 90th percentile epidemic and differences in how results 
are presented. Garner estimated nearly 20% of staff needed was 
veterinarians, while we estimated 33%.
The calculation of resources needed is an iterative process. 
The simulation model includes assumptions regarding resources, 
to simulate realistic epidemics, as scarce resources will prolong 
the epidemics. After assuming the available resources, we then 
calculate the daily needs. Naturally, this seems like a circular argu-
ment. However, in the simulation model, resources are roughly 
set as numbers of animals or herds that can be processed daily for 
either depopulation or surveillance. In the resource calculation 
presented here, we go into details regarding the teams for each 
task, the time needed, and look at number of herds and numbers 
of animals to process. The influence of the assumptions regarding 
resources has previously been described for depopulation (5) 
and surveillance (19). In both situations, the influence of reduc-
ing the resources was limited, reflecting that plenty of resources 
were assumed for most simulated outbreaks. This means that the 
calculations presented in this paper closely reflect the daily needs, 
when resources are not a limiting factor.
One of the assumptions was that all three veterinary regions 
would be involved from the beginning of the epidemic. While 
this was not truly realistic, the influence of this assumption was 
assumed to be limited, as many parameters even in the LCC 
depended on the numbers of herds and animals involved in the 
epidemic rather than the numbers of LCC. However, overall, we 
did estimate a clear decrease in the manpower needed for veteri-
narians as well as technicians and administrative staff. Therefore, 
an adjustment of the model taking region into account will be 
considered in future versions of the model.
In the current estimations, the very basic needs during an epi-
demic were estimated. Traveling time between herds was taken 
into account in the estimates (Table 1), while logistic challenges 
were not taken into account, such as veterinarians stuck in a herd 
after a surveillance visit that turned out to become a detection of 
an infected herd. In situations like that the veterinarian will stay 
in the detected herd and will not be able to visit other herds for the 
two following days. However, we assumed that the veterinarian 
would then be able to carry out other tasks, for example in the 
LCC. The competences needed for personnel involved in each 
task are described in details in the contingency plan for FMD (24) 
and in the project report (22). Furthermore, geographical chal-
lenges were not taken into consideration in these calculations. 
Denmark is a rather small country, where farmost destinations 
can be reached in a reasonable driving time (3–4 h). However, 
longer driving time will of course reduce the number of herds 
a veterinarian can visit on a given day. Nevertheless, estimating 
the amount of personnel needed gives us no answers in itself. 
To be able to use these estimates, it is necessary for the Danish 
Veterinary and Food Administration to compare with the present 
staff available and to consider how and where more personnel can 
be recruited to meet the needs during a crisis and which type of 
training is required in peace time, to be ready for an outbreak. The 
working group has continued working on this matter to update 
the Danish FMD contingency plan according to the results of 
the resource estimations and has given detailed descriptions on 
required competences for different types of staff for different tasks 
and how people can be trained to meet the challenges during a 
crisis. All of these results are described in a report from the expert 
group, in Danish (22).
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